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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case requires us to consider the application of 
the jurisdictional bar in the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") to the judicial 
adjudication of claims when the claimant has not complied with 
3 
FIRREA's claims procedures.0  Bell Savings Bank, PaSA ("Bell") 
confessed judgment in a Pennsylvania state court against W.W. 
Development and Management Company ("W.W.") following W.W.'s 
default on a $500,000 loan.  After the Director of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision, Department of the Treasury, declared Bell 
insolvent and appointed the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") 
its conservator and then its receiver, W.W. filed: (1) a petition 
to open the judgment, offering defenses and a counterclaim in the 
state court action which the RTC subsequently removed to a 
federal court and, after the administrative claims period passed, 
(2) a separate action restating the same claims in federal court. 
The district court denied the petition in the first case and 
granted summary judgment to the RTC in the second case, as it 
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over W.W.'s 
claims in both cases as a result of FIRREA's jurisdictional bar. 
For reasons that we explain below, we will affirm the district 
court's order as to its conclusion that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the second lawsuit and over W.W.'s counterclaim 
in the first.  We, however, will vacate the district court's 
order to the extent that it rejected jurisdiction over W.W.'s 
defenses to liability in W.W.'s petition to open judgment. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The two cases arose from a loan and a loan commitment 
agreement between Bell and W.W. for financing W.W.'s development 
                     
0Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
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of a medical office condominium in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
W.W.'s App. 54.  Initially, Bell loaned W.W. $500,000 on August 
20, 1987.  Id. at 45.  In the loan documents, W.W. authorized 
Bell to confess judgment against it in the amount of the loan 
plus interest if W.W. defaulted.  Id. at 43.  On September 6, 
1988, Bell agreed to loan W.W. $3,314,000 for further development 
of the property.  This commitment was valid until October 30, 
1988.  Id. at 121-28.  W.W. planned to use part of this loan to 
pay off the earlier loan of $500,000.  Id. at 91.  On October 3, 
1988, the parties extended the commitment date on the $3,314,000 
loan until April 30, 1989.  Id. at 95.  Bell, however, did not 
make this additional loan to W.W. which then defaulted on the 
earlier $500,000 loan.  Bell then confessed judgment against W.W. 
in the amount of $529,883.43 on June 13, 1990, in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.  Id. at 40-50. 
 On March 15, 1991, the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision found that Bell was likely to incur losses as a 
result of unsafe and unsound practices and appointed the RTC its 
conservator.0  As a result, under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i), 
the RTC succeeded to "[a]ll rights, titles, powers and 
privileges" of Bell.  Four days later, on March 19, 1991, the 
director appointed the RTC Bell's receiver.  The RTC then 
published notice that all creditors having claims against Bell 
                     
0Order No. 91-163.  RTC's App. 4.  After Bell Savings Bank was 
taken over the RTC organized Bell Federal Savings Bank to acquire 
Bell's assets.  As a matter of convenience we refer simply to 
Bell as a single institution. 
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must submit them by June 22, 1991, but it later extended this 
time, at least as to W.W., until September 27, 1991.   
 On March 26, 1991, W.W. filed a petition to open the 
confessed judgment in the Philadelphia County Court of Common 
Pleas, alleging that Bell's breach of its commitment on the 
proposed $3,314,000 loan caused W.W. to default on the $500,000 
loan.  In addition, W.W. sought to assert a counterclaim for 
damages from Bell's breach.  W.W.'s App. 51-60.0 
 On April 24, 1991, the RTC removed the state court 
proceedings, including the judgment and the petition to open the 
judgment, to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a) and 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1441a(l)(3).0  W.W.'s App. 96.  Thus, we will refer to this 
                     
0We accept W.W.'s representation that it was unaware that Bell 
was in receivership at this time.  We observe, however, that this 
circumstance has no legal significance.  We will refer to W.W.'s 
defenses and counterclaim as if they have been filed even though 
its petition merely sought permission to file them.  W.W.'s Br. 
at 6. 
012 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3) reads: 
 
(3) Removal and remand 
 
(A) In general 
 
 The Corporation, in any capacity 
and without bond or security, may remove 
any action, suit, or proceeding from a 
State court to the United States 
district court with jurisdiction over 
the place where the action, suit, or 
proceeding is pending, to the United 
States district court for the District 
of Columbia, or to the United States 
district court with jurisdiction over 
the principal place of business of any 
institution for which the Corporation 
has been appointed conservator or 
6 
case as the removed case.  On May 18, 1991, the District of 
Columbia court transferred the removed case to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  W.W.'s App. 101.   
 On August 5, 1991, shortly before the deadline for the 
filing of claims under FIRREA against the RTC as receiver for 
Bell, counsel for W.W. wrote a letter to the RTC's counsel 
advising him of the pending petition to open judgment and of 
W.W.'s claims against the RTC.  The letter stated: 
As you are aware, . . . the Motion to Open 
Judgment that is presently pending, in 
addition to setting forth grounds to open the 
judgment and defenses against that judgment, 
includes claims for damages incurred as a 
result of the subject breach by Bell of its 
Agreement to loan sufficient funds to W.W. 
Development. . . . 
 
I assume that, given the fact that RTC is in 
receipt of these claims, no further filings 
are required by my client in order to permit 
RTC to determine these claims pursuant to 12 
U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(5). If this assumption is 
incorrect, I would appreciate your prompt 
advice and would further appreciate your 
                                                                  
receiver if the action, suit or 
proceeding is brought against the 
institution or the Corporation as 
conservator or receiver of such 
institution.  The removal of any such 
suit or proceeding shall be instituted- 
 
(i) not later than 90 days after 
the date the Corporation is 
substituted as a party, or 
 
(ii) not later than 30 days after 
service on the Corporation, if the 
Corporation is named as a party in 
any capacity and if such suit is 
filed after August 9, 1989. 
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providing me with any forms which should be 
completed by my client in order to obtain 
review and determination by RTC of these 
claims.  Your prompt advice would be most 
appreciated and in the event I do not hear 
from you to the contrary, I will assume that 
the presentation of the claims of my client 
in the Motion to Open Judgment are sufficient 
to permit the RTC to administratively 
determine such claims. 
 
W.W.'s App. 156-157.  There is some dispute as to whether the RTC 
responded to this letter but we will assume in accordance with 
W.W.'s contention that it did not.0  In any event, W.W. did not 
file a formal claim with RTC within the period for filing claims 
even as extended to September 27, 1991.   
 On September 15, 1992, almost one year after the time 
to file a formal claim had expired, and after counsel suggested 
that the proceedings in the removed case be postponed, the court 
referred that case to a magistrate judge to explore settlement. 
Upon joint request of the parties, the district court suspended 
the proceedings on the petition to open the judgment for five 
months on September 22, 1992.  Id. at 108.  Finally, on October 
7, 1992, W.W. filed a formal proof of claim with the RTC.  On 
June 8, 1993, the RTC denied W.W.'s October 7, 1992 
administrative claim on the ground that W.W. did not return an 
official claim form before the deadline for filing claims.  In 
the letter denying the claim and explaining the bar, the RTC 
                     
0W.W.'s counsel claims that he did not receive a reply to the 
letter.  RTC's counsel states that the RTC sent W.W. a claims 
form on August 27, 1991, though W.W. did not return the completed 
claims form until after the deadline.  Our assumption does not 
prejudice the RTC because the relief we are granting W.W., i.e., 
that it may assert its defenses to the complaint resulting in the 
judgment by confession, does not depend on it. 
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stated that W.W. could file suit within 60 days from the date of 
the letter.  Id. at 174-75. 
 On August 5, 1993, within that 60-day period, W.W. 
filed the second action, which we will call the federal case, 
against the RTC in its capacity as receiver for Bell, alleging 
that Bell's failure to adhere to its loan commitment caused W.W. 
damages of $2,996,150.  This federal case essentially restated 
W.W.'s claims in its petition to open judgment.  On June 20, 
1994, the court transferred the petition to open judgment in the 
removed case to its current docket.  Id. at 109.   
 The RTC then moved for summary judgment in the federal 
case, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C)(i)0 since W.W. did 
not file an official claim form until after the bar date of 
September 27, 1991.  W.W.'s App. 136.  W.W. filed a cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment declaring that it had filed a timely 
administrative claim.  The district court rejected the RTC's 
argument, reasoning that the petition to open, filed on March 26, 
1991, and served on the RTC in April 1991, coupled with W.W.'s 
                     
012 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C)(i) reads in relevant part: 
 
(C) Disallowance of claims filed after end of 
filing period 
 
(i) In general 
 
Except as provided in clause (ii), claims 
filed after the date specified in the notice 
published under paragraph (3)(B)(i) shall be 
disallowed and such disallowance shall be 
final. 
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letter of August 5, 1991, requesting notification if its 
administrative claim was incomplete, constituted a sufficient and 
timely administrative claim.  Id. at 22-25.  As a result, the 
district court on July 15, 1994, denied the RTC's motion for 
summary judgment and granted W.W.'s cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment establishing that its claim was timely.  Id. at 
26.   
 The RTC then filed a motion for reconsideration on the 
grounds that if W.W's claim was considered filed by August 5, 
1991, as the district court had held, then under 12 U.S.C. 
§1821(d)(5)(A)(i),0 the claim was deemed denied as a matter of 
                     
012 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i) reads in relevant part: 
 
(5) Procedures for determination of claims 
 
(A) Determination period 
 
(i) In General 
 
 Before the end of the 180-day 
period beginning on the date any 
claim against a depository 
institution is filed with the 
Corporation as receiver, the 
Corporation shall determine whether 
to allow or disallow the claim and 
shall notify the claimant of any 
determination with respect to such 
claim. 
 
(ii) Extension of time 
 
 The period described in clause 
(i) may be extended by a written 
agreement between the claimant and 
the Corporation. 
 
(iii) Mailing of notice sufficient 
. . . . 
 
10 
law on February 3, 1992, the end of the 180-day period in which 
the RTC should have acted on the claim.  Thus, in the RTC's view, 
W.W. was required to have filed its district court action within 
60 days of February 3, 1992 (i.e., on or before April 4, 1992) 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(B).0  The RTC argued that since W.W. 
did not file the federal case until August 5, 1993, the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it.  W.W.'s App. 
31-34.  The district court agreed and granted the RTC's motion 
for summary judgment on November 17, 1994.  Id.  In the same 
order, the district court denied W.W.'s petition to open judgment 
in the removed case on the grounds that W.W. filed the petition 
after Bell was placed in receivership.  Consequently, the court 
held that it lacked jurisdiction because W.W. did not properly 
exhaust its claims administratively before filing the petition. 
After the district court, on February 27, 1995, denied W.W.'s 
                                                                  
(iv) Contents of notice of 
disallowance 
 
 If any claim filed under 
clause (i) is disallowed, the 
notice to the claimant shall 
contain- 
 
(I) a statement of each reason 
for the disallowance; and 
 
(II) the procedures available 
for obtaining agency review of 
the determination to disallow 
the claim or judicial 
determination of the claim. 
0The RTC used the April 4, 1992 date in its brief.  It appears 
that the correct date was April 3, 1992.  Of course, the 
difference does not matter. 
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motion for reconsideration, W.W. appealed in both cases from the 
orders of November 17, 1994, and February 27, 1995. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 
because W.W. filed a timely notice of appeal on March 22, 1995.  
Because the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is 
the central issue in the case, we discuss it below.  We exercise 
plenary review on this appeal.  See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarket, 
Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993). 
  Congress enacted FIRREA in 1989 in response to the 
massive losses occurring in the nation's savings and loan 
institutions and the deposit insurance fund protecting their 
depositors.  H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 
302, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 98.  In its report on 
FIRREA, Congress projected that the full cost of the thrift 
crisis would be more than $335 billion, noting, to give some 
perspective, that this expenditure would dwarf the $13.3 billion 
cost of the entire post-World War II Marshall Plan to reconstruct 
Europe.  Id. at 514.  Congress also expressed concern that 
higher-than-expected costs for case resolution could boost that 
figure.  Id. at 515.  To restore consumer confidence in the 
failed savings and loan industry and resolve the crisis, Congress 
granted the receivers of failed institutions broad powers to 
administer a streamlined claims procedure designed to dispose of 
the bulk of claims against failed savings and loans.  Id. at 305, 
12 
419.  Congress also designed FIRREA to be consistent with the 
Supreme Court's holding in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. 
FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 109 S.Ct. 1361 (1989), which dealt with the 
procedure for filing claims against the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation.  H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I) at 418-19.0   
 On this appeal, we are concerned with FIRREA's complex 
and, in practice, draconian jurisdictional provisions which, as 
we explain below, we must apply as written.  In brief, Congress 
requires the RTC to notify claimants to submit their claims on or 
before a date at least 90 days from the date of publication of 
the notice.  Once they do so, the RTC has 180 days to allow or 
disallow their claims.  Claimants thereafter have 60 days from 
the earlier of the end of the 180-day period or the notice of 
denial of their claims to seek de novo judicial review.  No court 
has jurisdiction to hear any suit filed after this 60-day period 
against the RTC as receiver for a failed thrift. 
 Actions filed prior to institution of FIRREA 
proceedings may be stayed at the request of a conservator or 
receiver.  If a claimant then submits a claim and it is denied or 
the 180-day period expires without a claim being allowed or 
                     
0In Coit, the Court held that the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation, the RTC's predecessor with respect to 
failed thrifts, under pre-FIRREA law, did not have exclusive 
authority to adjudicate claims filed against failed savings and 
loan institutions and that a claimant was entitled to a de novo 
review of the corporation's disposition of a claim in the 
district court.  489 U.S. at 587, 109 S.Ct. at 1376.  The Court 
noted, however, that requiring exhaustion of the claim process 
would be permissible if the claim process included a reasonable 
time limit on the corporation's ability to postpone judicial 
review.  Id. at 584, 109 S.Ct. at 1374. 
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disallowed, claimants have 60 days to continue their pre-
receivership actions.0  With this plan, Congress hoped to promote 
expeditious and fair adjudication of the many claims against the 
failed thrifts.  
 The central issue in this case is whether W.W.'s 
actions are jurisdictionally barred under FIRREA and thus whether 
the district court's dismissal of the actions was proper. 
I. The federal case 
 We first will consider whether the district court had 
jurisdiction over the federal case which W.W. filed on August 5, 
1993, after the RTC rejected its formal claim.  We held in Rosa 
v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981, 112 
S.Ct. 582 (1991), that a district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim under FIRREA only if the claimant 
exhausts the statutory claim procedure.  Id. at 391-92, 396-97. 
See also Althouse v. RTC, 969 F.2d 1544, 1545-46 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that failure to file timely claim precludes jurisdiction 
and de novo review by district court); FDIC v. Shain, Schaffer & 
Rafanello, 944 F.2d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that courts 
have no jurisdiction over claims besides that specified in 
FIRREA).  Our conclusion in Rosa follows from 12 U.S.C. 
§1821(d)(13)(D), which states: 
(D) Limitation on Judicial Review 
                     
0In Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 46, 
63 n.14 (3d Cir. 1991), we pointed out that FIRREA in some 
respects is unclear as to its treatment of a claimant's action 
filed before the institution of FIRREA proceedings.  We need not 
explore that problem here because W.W. filed its first pleading, 
its petition to open judgment, after the RTC was appointed 
receiver. 
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 Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction 
over- 
 
(i) any claim or action for payment 
from, or any action seeking a 
determination of rights with respect to, 
the assets of any depository institution 
for which the Corporation has been 
appointed receiver, including assets 
which the Corporation may acquire from 
itself as such receiver; or 
 
(ii) any claim relating to any act or 
omission of such institution or the 
Corporation as receiver. 
 
 To determine whether the district court has 
jurisdiction over the controversy, we look to whether W.W. 
followed the statutory claim procedure.  This procedure is set 
out at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A), which reads: 
(6) Provision for agency review or judicial 
determination of claims 
 
(A) In general 
 
Before the end of the 60-day period 
beginning on the earlier of- 
 
(i)the end of the period described in 
paragraph (5)(A)(i) with respect to any 
claim against a depository institution 
for which the Corporation is receiver; 
or 
 
(ii) the date of any notice of 
disallowance of such claim pursuant to 
paragraph (5)(A)(i), 
the claimant may request administrative 
review of the claim in accordance with 
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (7) or 
file suit on such claim (or continue an 
action commenced before the appointment of 
the receiver) in the district or territorial 
court of the United States for the district 
within which the depository institution's 
15 
principal place of business is located or the 
United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia (and such court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear such claim). 
 The "period described in paragraph (5)(A)(i)" is the 
180-day period during which the RTC is required to determine 
whether to allow or disallow the claim and notify the claimant of 
its determination.  The parties can extend this period only upon 
their written agreement.0  Absent written agreement to extend the 
180-day period, a claimant must seek judicial review before the 
earlier of 60 days from the determination of its claim or 240 
days from the date its claim was filed (the 180 days of section 
1821(d)(5)(A)(i), plus the 60 days of section 1821(d)(6)(A)) even 
if, as in this case, the RTC fails to make a determination within 
the statutorily required 180-day period specified in section 
1821(d)(5)(A)(i).0  Astrup v. RTC, 23 F.3d 1419, 1420-21 (8th 
Cir. 1994); Capitol Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 
1993); Henderson v. Bank of New England, 986 F.2d 319, 320 (9th 
Cir., cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 559 (1993).  
 In this case, treating W.W.'s petition to reopen in the 
removed case and its counsel's August 5, 1991 letter to RTC's 
counsel as together constituting a properly filed claim, W.W. 
                     
012 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(ii). 
0Congress clearly contemplated the possibility of the 180-day 
period expiring without the RTC having resolved a claim, for 
section 1821(d)(6)(A) states that a claimant has 60 days after 
the expiration of the 180-day claim determination period or the 
disallowance of a claim to seek administrative review or to 
institute an action in court.  If Congress had not contemplated 
the possibility of the 180-day period expiring without the RTC 
having resolved a claim, the first limitation period would have 
been superfluous, since there never would be an instance in which 
the 180-day period would expire without the resolution of a 
claim.   
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failed to bring the federal case in the district court within the 
statutorily-specified time period.  The district court held that 
W.W. provided the RTC with the information necessary to process 
its claim in April 1991 when it served its March 26, 1991 
petition to open (filed in the Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas) on the RTC.  At the latest, treating these informal 
filings, i.e., the petition and the letter, as satisfying the 
requirement to file an administrative claim, the 240-day period 
began in August, after W.W. sent the RTC the letter requesting 
adjudication of its claim.0  Yet W.W. did not file the federal 
case until August 5, 1993.  Since more than 240 days elapsed 
between the filing of the claim with RTC and the filing of the 
federal case in the district court, the district court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction over it.  
                     
0The RTC contends that service of the petition did not constitute 
a properly filed claim and that FIRREA bars W.W.'s action because 
it did not file an appropriate claim form within 90 days of 
receiving notice to do so, as required by 12 U.S.C. 
§1821(d)(5)(C)(i).  If the RTC is correct so that W.W.'s 
petition, either independently or accompanied by its letter of 
August 5, 1991, did not constitute a claim, the district court 
would have lacked jurisdiction because W.W. would not have 
followed the proper administrative procedures. 
 
 Nevertheless, since we find that even if a pleading can 
constitute a claim under FIRREA, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over this claim, we need not address this issue.  We 
therefore assume without deciding that the procedures W.W. 
followed in 1991 constituted compliance with the FIRREA claims 
procedure.  Of course, the petition could not be an adequate 
claim in the removed case itself, because FIRREA contemplates an 
administrative claim procedure independent of a judicial 
proceeding.  Treating the petition as an adequate administrative 
filing to support jurisdiction in the removed case would 
frustrate the two-step process FIRREA contemplates.   
17 
 W.W. argues that the court possessed jurisdiction over 
the federal case because there was a written agreement, pursuant 
to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(ii), to extend the 180-day period in 
which the RTC was required to resolve W.W.'s claims.  W.W. argues 
that: (i) motions to the district court to stay the removed case 
constitute written agreements between the RTC and W.W., and (ii) 
that the RTC's denial of W.W.'s October 7, 1992 claim on June 8, 
1993, in explicitly granting W.W. 60 days to appeal, also 
constitutes a written agreement, albeit a retroactive one, to 
extend the 180-day period for consideration of its 1991 claim. 
Thus, in W.W.'s view, its action filed August 5, 1993, was 
timely.  Alternatively, W.W. argues that material written by the 
RTC after the expiration of the 180-day period should extend 
retroactively the 180-day period.0   
                     
0W.W. cites a letter to the district court dated February 9, 
1993, which states: 
 
On or about October 5, 1992, after the case 
was placed in the suspense file, defendant 
W.W. Development & Management, Inc. submitted 
an administrative claim to the Resolution 
Trust Corporation pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 
§1821(d)(5). Pursuant to Section 1821(d) the 
claim must be decided within 180 days of 
filing (i.e., on or about April 3, 1993). 
Accordingly, we request that the matter 
remain in the suspense file until April or 
until the claim has been decided, whichever 
is earlier.  Of course if the claim is 
decided before April 3, we will promptly 
notify the Court.  Edward Rubenstone, counsel 
for defendant, joins in this request. 
 
W.W.'s App. 173. 
 
When the RTC denied W.W.'s claim on June 8, 1993, its letter to 
W.W. stated: 
18 
  To support its contentions, W.W. points out that 
section 1821(d)(5)(A)(ii) provides that the 180-day period, "may 
be extended by a written agreement between the claimant and the 
Corporation."  On June 24, 1991, the RTC filed a motion to stay 
all legal proceedings in the removed case.  It read in part: 
For the reasons set forth in the following 
Memorandum of Law, substituted plaintiff 
Resolution Trust Corporation, in its capacity 
as Conservator for Bell Federal Savings Bank, 
moves the Court for an Order staying 
consideration of defendant's Motion to Open 
Judgment pending exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. 
 
W.W.'s App. 106-07.  On August 14, 1991, W.W. filed a Memorandum 
of Law in response which argued, in part, that the district court 
should stay further proceedings for 180 days so that 
administrative procedures could be exhausted.  It read in part: 
"under the facts of this case . . . the issuance by this Court of 
a stay for 180 days as to the prosecution of such claims is 
appropriate."  W.W.'s App. 197.   
   W.W. further argues that Congress intended the deadline 
provisions to constrain only the RTC and it suggests that 
Congress drafted them in response to the concerns raised by the 
Supreme Court in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 
U.S. at 582-83, 109 S.Ct. at 1373, where the Court noted that the 
                                                                  
Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(d)(6), if 
you wish to contest this disallowance, then, 
within sixty (60) days from the date of this 
letter you must file suit on your claim 
against the Receiver in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania . . . . 
 
Id. at 175. 
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lack of deadline periods enabled the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation to delay judicial review indefinitely. W.W. 
argues that the legislative history offers no support for the 
RTC's use of the deadline procedures to defeat a claim.  It 
further argues that allowing the RTC to evaluate claims even 
after the 180-day period has elapsed would serve the purpose of 
FIRREA.0  
 When a statute is clear, however, our role in 
interpretation is at an end, absent a clearly expressed 
legislative intention that contradicts the plain language of the 
statute.  Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 
447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056 (1980); Sacred Heart 
Medical Center v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 545 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Nothing that W.W. cites is "a written agreement between the 
                     
0The legislative history explains that the claims procedure set 
forth in FIRREA was designed: 
 
[To enable] the FDIC to dispose of the bulk 
of claims against failed financial 
institutions expeditiously and fairly.  The 
exhaustion requirements should lead to a 
large number of claims being resolved without 
resort to further procedures.  In addition, 
the administrative procedures, including 
review procedures, created by the FDIC, if 
made sufficiently attractive to claimants, 
should lead to a large number of claimants 
agreeing to present their claims through 
these forums rather than in court.  Thus, the 
claim resolution process established in this 
section should allow the FDIC to quickly 
resolve many of the claims against failed 
financial institutions without unduly 
burdening the District Courts. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 (I) at 419. 
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claimant and the Corporation" to extend the 180-day period.    
Furthermore, W.W. cannot point to "a clearly expressed 
legislative intention" that contradicts the plain language of the 
statute and thus would allow us to treat the items to which it 
points as an agreement for an extension of the 180-day claim 
consideration period.  GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 108, 100 S.Ct. 
at 2056.  Consequently, we cannot find that the 180-day claim 
period was extended to permit the district court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the federal case.0     
 We recognize that our result is harsh.  The RTC 
disallowed the claim on the basis of untimeliness despite W.W.'s 
good faith efforts and request for guidance from the RTC to 
comply with the new and confusing statute.  In addition, the 
RTC's actions encouraged W.W. to believe that its claim was under 
serious administrative consideration as the statutory period for 
judicial review expired.  Furthermore, we acknowledge that "[t]he 
statute arguably encourages the RTC to avoid making 
determinations and, in so doing, catch creditors dozing." Astrup, 
                     
0Of course, the claim W.W. filed on October 7, 1992, was late so 
even if there had been a written agreement to extend the time for 
the receiver to allow or disallow the claim to June 8, 1993, when 
the RTC disallowed the claim, which as far as we are aware there 
was not, the district court would have granted the RTC summary 
judgment properly as W.W. filed the claim long after the bar 
date.  We must say, however, that we are at a loss to understand 
why the RTC in its June 8, 1993 letter advised W.W. that it could 
file suit within 60 days, inasmuch as the RTC denied the October 
7, 1992 claim long after 180 days following its submission.  It 
would seem that the RTC was attempting to give the district court 
jurisdiction which the court did not have.  It may be that on 
this basis as well the district court, notwithstanding the June 
8, 1993 letter, did not have jurisdiction.  But we do not reach 
that point. 
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23 F.3d at 1421.  But our hands are tied under the statutory 
scheme.  See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav. Bank, 
F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1994) ("FIRREA was  . . . 
passed to give the receiver extraordinary power.").  We therefore 
hold that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the 
federal case. 
II.  The removed case 
 W.W. also argues that the district court had 
jurisdiction in the removed case over the petition to open the 
judgment and to allow it to assert defenses and a counterclaim. 
The relevant facts are that Bell filed its action for confession 
of judgment before the RTC was appointed receiver for Bell but 
that W.W. filed its petition after that appointment.   
 FIRREA, though allowing the RTC to remove state cases 
to a federal court, does not generally divest courts of 
jurisdiction in pre-receivership cases.  This is clear from 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii), which provides, with an exception 
dealing with stays, that filing a claim with a receiver does not 
prejudice the right of a claimant to continue an action filed 
before the receiver's appointment.  It necessarily follows from 
this section that the institution of a proceeding under FIRREA 
does not oust a court of the jurisdiction it otherwise would have 
over an action involving a thrift institution.  Accordingly, in 
Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 63 
n.14 (3d Cir. 1991), we explained that if an action is filed 
before a thrift is placed in receivership, jurisdiction over the 
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matter is not lost by the subsequent insolvency of the thrift and 
takeover by the RTC.  Id.    
 Bell commenced the removed action by confessing 
judgment against W.W.0  In National Union, 28 F.3d 393, we held 
that section 1821(d)(13)(D)'s statutory bar does not apply to 
either defenses or affirmative defenses to a claim brought by the 
RTC because: 
We think it plain enough that a defense or an 
affirmative defense is neither an 'action' 
nor a 'claim,' but rather is a response to an 
action or a claim, and that therefore 
defenses and affirmative defenses do not fall 
under any of the [categories of action barred 
by § 1821(d)(13)(D)]. 
 
See also Praxis, 947 F.2d 49, 64 n.14 (Neither exhaustion 
requirement nor administrative claims procedure apply to actions 
the thrift commenced before it failed.).   
 Consequently, we must decide whether the petition to 
open the judgment was a separate claim against the RTC or whether 
it should be regarded as defense and therefore not barred by 
section 1821(d)(13)(D).  Because the petition to open judgment 
includes both a defense to liability in the action commenced 
before the FIRREA proceedings (though not a conventional defense 
as in an action in which process is served at the outset), and a 
counterclaim against RTC, we will bifurcate the petition and 
separately consider the defenses and the counterclaim.0  This 
                     
0Of course, the district court had jurisdiction over the judgment 
and could have entertained enforcement proceedings for its 
collection.  Thus, we deal with W.W.'s pleadings, not those of 
the RTC. 
0The petition itself is broken into three sections.  Section I is 
headed:  
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procedure is consistent with that which we followed in National 
Union, 28 F.3d at 383-95, where we separately considered whether 
FIRREA barred affirmative defenses and declaratory judgment 
actions even when both were based on the same legal grounds.  We 
find that the defenses offered in the petition to open judgment 
are not subject to FIRREA's statutory bar, but that the 
counterclaim in the petition is jurisdictionally barred by 
FIRREA. 
A.  The defenses 
 We first consider the defenses to the confessed 
judgment included in the petition to open the judgment.  In 
deciding whether or not FIRREA bars jurisdiction over this part 
of the petition, we are guided by the Supreme Court's recent 
holding in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S.Ct. 2048 (1994), 
which explained that "matters left unaddressed" in FIRREA "are 
                                                                  
 
As a Result of Bell's Breach of Contract and 
Other Wrongful Conduct, Petitioner has 
Numerous Bona Fide, Good Faith Defenses to 
Bell's Claims, Thereby Warranting the Opening 
of the Subject Judgment by Confession. 
 
W.W.'s App. 54. 
 
Section II is headed: 
 
Defendant has Incurred Substantial Damages as 
a Direct Result of Plaintiff's Breach of 
Contract, Thereby Entitling it to Assert a 
Counterclaim in this Action.  
 
Id. at 57-59. 
 
Section III requests an order staying the execution of the 
confessed judgment.  Id. at 59-60. 
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presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state 
law."  Id. at 2054.  We thus consider how the petition would be 
viewed under Pennsylvania law. 
 In Pennsylvania, a petition to open a judgment is 
integral to the process of determining the debtor's and 
creditor's rights.0  See Davis v. Woxall Hotel, Inc., 577 A.2d 
                     
0Pa. R. Civ. P. 2959 governs the procedure on a petition to open 
a judgment.  While W.W. characterized its petition as a motion, 
inasmuch as that section refers to a petition, we have called the 
pleading a petition.  The rule reads: 
 
Rule 2959.  Striking Off or Opening Judgment; 
Pleadings; Procedure 
 
(a) Relief from a judgment by confession 
shall be sought by petition.  All grounds for 
relief, whether to strike off the judgment or 
to open it, must be asserted in a single 
petition.  The petition may be filed in the 
county in which the judgment was originally 
entered, in any county to which the judgment 
has been transferred or in any other county 
in which the sheriff has received a writ of 
execution directed to him to enforce the 
judgment. 
 
(b) If the petition states prima facie 
grounds for relief the court shall issue a 
rule to show cause and may grant a stay of 
proceedings.  After being served with a copy 
of the petition the plaintiff shall file an 
answer on or before the return day of the 
rule.  The return day of the rule shall be 
fixed by the court by local rule or special 
order. 
 
(c) A party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not include in his 
petition or answer. 
 
(d) The petition and the rule to show cause 
and the answer shall be served as provided in 
Rule 440. 
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636, 638 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("[A] challenge to the accuracy of 
such amounts should be resolved by a petition to open the 
judgment.").  Passed as part of the same chapter as the provision 
governing a confession of judgment, a petition to open a judgment 
is the sole means by which the defendant in a confession of 
judgment action can assert a defense.  If the party against whom 
judgment is confessed pleads prima facie grounds for relief, the 
court must open the judgment, and "may grant a stay of 
proceedings."  Pa. R. Civ. P. 2959(b).  The use of the word 
"proceedings" suggests that the petition should be understood as 
part of the same action as the underlying confession of judgment. 
This interpretation is strengthened by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court's discussion: 
A petition to strike and a petition to open 
are two forms of relief with separate 
remedies; each is intended to relieve a 
different type of defect in the confession of 
judgment proceedings. . . . [A] petition to 
open the judgment offers to show that the 
defendant can prove a defense to all or part 
of the plaintiff's claim. 
                                                                  
(e) The court shall dispose of the rule on 
petition and answer, and on any testimony, 
depositions, admissions and other evidence. 
The court for cause shown may stay 
proceedings on the petition insofar as it 
seeks to open the judgment pending 
disposition of the application to strike off 
the judgment.  If evidence is produced which 
in a jury trial would require the issues to 
be submitted to the jury the court shall open 
the judgment. 
 
(f) The lien of the judgment or of any levy 
or attachment shall be preserved while the 
proceedings to strike off or open the 
judgment are pending. 
 
26 
 
Manor Bldg. Corp. v. Manor Complex Assocs., LTD., 645 A.2d 843, 
845 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (emphasis added).  The court's 
reference to the petition to open as "a defense" in "confession 
of judgment proceedings" indicates that a defense to liability in 
a petition to open is part of an overall confession of judgment 
procedure and not an independent action. 
 Moreover, the Pennsylvania courts have noted the 
importance of a petition to open a judgment in satisfying due 
process in the confession of judgment procedure.  North Penn 
Consumer Discount Co. v. Shultz, 378 A.2d 1275, 1277-78 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1977).0  We find, therefore, that the defenses alleged 
in the petition to open judgment are part of a pre-receivership 
action and thus under sections 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii) and 
1821(d)(13)(D) the district court may entertain them without 
regard for the jurisdictional bar in the latter section.  
 In reaching our result, we also point out that section 
1821(d)(13)(D) bars jurisdiction only over "any claim or action 
for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights 
with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for 
                     
0We note that the Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure 
has raised serious due process issues in the past.  See Jordan v. 
Fox, Rothschild, O'Brian & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).  
The existence of the opportunity to present a defense provided by 
the petition to open judgment may well be crucial to the 
constitutionality of the procedure.  See Girard Trust Bank v. 
Martin, 557 F.2d 386 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985, 98 
S.Ct. 612 (1977) (construing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Corp., 
405 U.S. 174, 92 S.Ct. 775 (1972), to seem to require that "there 
be some procedure by which debtor against whom judgment is 
confessed may test the validity of the judgment against him").  
These concerns also support construing a petition to open 
judgment as part of the same action as a confession of judgment.   
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which the Corporation has been appointed receiver."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  We regard the defenses offered by W.W. in the 
petition to open judgment as pertaining to its assets, not those 
of Bell, because a judgment has value only insofar as it can be 
the basis for a recovery from a debtor's assets.   
 Finally, on this point we observe that at oral argument 
counsel for the RTC acknowledged that if a thrift filed an action 
before the Office of Thrift Supervision instituted proceedings to 
take it over under FIRREA, a defendant in that case after the 
initiation of the FIRREA proceedings could assert defenses 
without exhausting administrative procedures, so long as it did 
not seek affirmative relief.  In view of our conclusions 
regarding the nature of a petition to reopen under Pennsylvania 
law, this concession essentially means that the RTC agrees that 
W.W. should be able to assert its defenses in the removed case.  
B.  The counterclaim 
 The counterclaim for damages included in the petition 
to open stands on a different footing.  Unless a claimant 
exhausts the statutory claim procedure, FIRREA divests courts of 
jurisdiction over "any claim or action for payment from, or any 
action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the 
assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation 
has been appointed receiver . . . ."  Section 1821(d)(13)(D).  
While defenses to Bell's confession of judgment action pertain to 
the assets of W.W., the counterclaim clearly asserts a claim over 
Bell's assets.  "[I]f in addition to raising defenses or 
affirmative defenses to an action or a claim, a party also raises 
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counterclaims, such counterclaims would fall under section 
1821(D)(13)(D)'s jurisdictional bar."  National Union, 28 F.3d at 
394.  We must decide, then, whether a counterclaim should escape 
section 1821(d)(13)(D)'s jurisdictional bar because it should be 
regarded as a continuation of a pre-receivership lawsuit under 
section 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii). 
 Congress's express purpose in creating the claims 
determination procedure embodied in FIRREA was to: 
[E]nable[] the FDIC to dispose of the bulk of 
claims against failed financial institutions 
expeditiously and fairly.  The exhaustion 
requirements should lead to a large number of 
claims being resolved without resort to 
further procedures. . . . Thus, the claim 
resolution process established in this 
section should allow the FDIC to quickly 
resolve many of the claims against failed 
financial institutions without unduly 
burdening the District Courts. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I) at 419.  The counterclaim brought by 
W.W., in contrast to its defenses to the confessed judgment, is a 
"claim[] against [a] failed financial institution," precisely the 
kind of post-receivership claim that Congress wanted resolved 
"expeditiously and fairly," through the administrative claims 
process.  A holding that a counterclaim is not barred would 
permit a litigant, as the district court observed, to "convert 
its claim to a pre-receivership claim merely by making it a part 
of litigation which predates the receiver's takeover."  W.W.'s 
App. 38.  This procedure would enable a claimant in a pending 
pre-receivership action effectively to evade FIRREA's strictures 
and thereby subvert Congress's express purpose to "allow the FDIC 
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to quickly resolve many of the claims without unduly burdening 
the district courts."  H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I) at 419. 
Consequently, we find that a post-receivership counterclaim is 
subject to section 1821(d)(13)(D)'s jurisdictional bar, at least 
if, as here, the counterclaim is asserted as a basis for relief 
beyond defeating the complaint.0 
 As a result, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 
lacked jurisdiction over the counterclaim when it was filed, 
because it was filed after RTC's appointment as receiver of Bell. 
Consequently, the district court never possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction over W.W.'s counterclaim, and properly dismissed 
this part of the removed action.  
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 We find that the district court properly granted 
summary judgment to the RTC in the federal case, No. 93-4210, as 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it.  The 
district court erred, however, in entirely denying the petition 
to open judgment in the removed case, No. 91-3788.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of 
the RTC No. 93-4210 and will affirm the district court's denial 
of the petition to open judgment in No. 91-3788 with respect to 
the counterclaim raised in the petition.  We will vacate the 
district court's denial of the petition to open judgment in No. 
                     
0We observe that interpreting FIRREA to preclude jurisdiction 
over a post-receivership counterclaim raises none of the due 
process concerns raised by interpreting FIRREA to prevent W.W. 
from raising a defense to a judgment confessed against it. 
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91-3788 with respect to the defenses to the confessed judgment 
raised in W.W.'s petition, and will remand the case to the 
district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Thus, we will affirm in part and will vacate in part the district 
court's orders of November 17, 1994, and February 29, 1995.  On 
the remand, the district court should consider the petition to 
open judgment without regard for the FIRREA jurisdictional bar, 
but only insofar as W.W. seeks to assert defenses to the 
complaint.  Of course, we express no opinion on whether the court 
should grant W.W. relief on its petition as we limit our opinion 
to the jurisdictional issues.  The parties will bear their own 
costs on this appeal. 
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